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Peter thought, "It's lucky that the dikes are high and strong.
Without these dikes, the land would be flooded and everything
would be washed away."
Suddenly he heard a soft, gurgling noise. He saw a small
stream of water trickling through a hole in the dike below. He
couldn't believe his eyes. There in the big strong dike was a
hole!
Peter slid down to the bottom of the dike. He put his finger
in the hole to keep the water from coming through.
Peter knew that if he let the water leak through the hole
in the dike, the hole would get bigger and bigger. Then the sea
would come gushing through. The fields and the houses and
tie windmills would all be flooded.*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently decided Sedima
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,' which was brought under the private
treble damages provision 2 of the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
* Green, N.B., The Hole in the Dike (1974) (adapted from a story first published
in Hans Brinker; or, The Silver Skates, by M.M. Dodge).
'105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). Sedima was a 5-4 decision. A companion case, American
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985), was
decided at the same time as Sedima. In Haroco, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois had imposed the requirement of a distinct RICO-type injury.
The United States Supreme Court, in affirming the Seventh Circuit's reversal, held that
a civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute
does not require "that the plaintiff have suffered damages by reason of the defendant's
violation of § 1962 through the prescribed predicate offenses," but that an injury resulting
from the predicate acts themselves was sufficient to support a claim. Id. at 3292. See
also note 10 infra.
2 Congress enacted RICO for the primary purpose of combating organized crime.
The statute's initial application was almost entirely confined to criminal prosecutions.
See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic
Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980). In addition
to RICO's criminal sanctions, Congress provided a civil cause of action in § 1964(c).
See also note 20 infra.
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rupt Organizations Act (RICO).' Sedima, the first civil RICO ac-
tion that the Supreme Court has addressed, gave private plaintiffs
the green light4 through an expansive interpretation of RICO's
statutory language as well as its application to civil actions.5 To
the dismay of potential civil RICO defendants, many of whom
are legitimate businesses, 6 the Sedima majority eliminated the two
grounds that lower courts commonly employed in dismissing pri-
vate RICO claims.7 The Sedima holding reversed the Second
Circuit's s restrictive interpretation that civil RICO claims require
both a previous conviction of the predicate criminal violations 9
and an allegation of a specific RICO-type injury.'0 The removal
of these two hurdles for civil RICO plaintiffs has led many ob-
servers to fear a flood of civil RICO actions."
' 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982). RICO is Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970 [hereinafter cited as OCCA], Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. RICO was
intended "to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening
legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and
by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities
of those engaged in organized crime." OCCA at 923 (statement of findings and purpose).
4 A private plaintiff under RICO is "[a]ny person injured in his buisness or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962." See note 20 infra.
I See 105 S. Ct. 3275.
6 Private RICO actions have been instituted by or against such companies as
Chase Manhattan Bank, General Foods, Shearson/American Express, International Busi-
ness Machines, and Rockwell International Corp. See Siegel, "RICO" Running Amok
in Board Rooms, L.A. Times, Feb. 15, 1984, at I, col. 4.
See notes 9-11 infra and accompanying text.
741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984).
The Sedima majority found no basis in either the statutory language or the
legislative history for imposing a criminal conviction requirement as a condition precedent
to recovery in a civil RICO action: "Had Congress intended to impose this novel
requirement, there would have been at least some mention of it in the legislative history,
even if not in the statute." 105 S. Ct. at 3282.
10 The Sedima majority rejected any contention that a civil RICO action must
allege and prove a RICO-type injury in addition to an injury caused directly by one of
the proscribed racketeering acts: "If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering
activity in a manner forbidden by these provisions, and the racketeering activities injure
the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c)." Id.
at 3285.
" The Sedima dissent expressed concern that the majority's decision would "make
compensable under civil RICO a host of claims that Congress never intended to bring
within RICO's purview." Id. at 3293 (Powell, J., dissenting). John M. Finch, Chairman of
the National Association of Manufacturers Task Force on RICO, was quoted as sayin,
"The original beneficiaries of RICO were legitimate business and legitimate labor. The irony
is that this shield has become a sword against the original beneficiaries. It's turned out to be
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Nevertheless, the dike holding back this flood of litigation
has not been destroyed totally. The remaining "fimger in the dike"
appears in Sedima as a footnote to the majority opinion 2 and in
Justice Powell's separate dissent.' 3 The issue left unresolved, and
thus open to further judicial construction, is the "pattern of rack-
eteering activity" element required for either conviction or re-
covery under RICO.' 4 This Comment examines and analyzes the
pattern requirement and attempts to both determine the present
judicial construction of the term pattern and predict what pos-
sible limiting effect this term may have in future civil RICO ac-
tions. This Comment discusses the statutory language requiring
a pattern,' 5 the legislative history surrounding the term's inclu-
sion,' 6 the judicial interpretion of pattern prior to Sedima,17 and
Sedima's effect on the requirement.'8
I. A Crvm RICO CAUSE OF ACTION' 9
To establish and maintain a private civil RICO action, 20
an unguided missle in the hands of the private bar." Greenhouse, Business and the Law:
The Argument Against RICO, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1985, at 30, col. . See also Nathan,
Civil RICO, 30 PRAc. LAw. 57, Jan. 15, 1984, at 60-61 (numerous courts expressing
concern over civil RICO abuse); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1364 (8th
Cir. 1980) (The Eighth Circuit warned that RICO's popularity might extend beyond the
intentions of Congress.) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). But cf. Blakey, The Act is
Neither Anti-Business Nor Pro-Business, It's Pro-Victim, Nat'l L.J., August 26, 1985,
at 24, col. 3 (Litigation will not reach "flood proportions" even with large increases in
filings.).
,2 See 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14.
' See id. at 3288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). See also note 22 infra.
, See notes 19-31 infra and accompanying text.
,6 See notes 32-45 infra and accompanying text.
,7 See notes 46-103 infra and accompanying text.
11 See notes 104-162 infra and accompanying text.
,9 For a comprehensive analysis of the elements of an action under RICO's private
plaintiff provision, see Moran, Pleading a Civil RICO Action Under Section 1962(c):
Conflicting Precedent and the Practitioner's Dilemna, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 731 (1984); Patton,
Civil RICO: Statutory and Implied Elements of the Treble Damage Remedy, 14 TEx.
TECH. L. Rav. 377 0983).
11 18 U.S.C. § 1964 provides civil remedies for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing
appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to
divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing
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a plaintiff must allege that a person2' has engaged in a pattern22
reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person,
including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the
same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which
affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorgan-
ization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent
persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In
any action brought by the United States under this section, the court shall
proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The substantive requirements for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 follow:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income
derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has partici-
pated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States
Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or
the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of
securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the
intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of
assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if
the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his
immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racket-
eering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase
do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities
of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to
elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
21 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) provides: " 'person' includes any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."
- 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (5) provides: " 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of
this chapter [October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding
any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
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of racketeering activity, 23 through which the defendant, directly
or indirectly, acquired or maintained an interest in an enterprise.
2 4
- 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) provides:
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in ob-
scene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following
provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery),
section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating
to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment)
if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating
to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to. the transmission
of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343
(relating to wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter),
section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to
obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruc-
tion of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference
with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeer-
ing), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering para-
phernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section
1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections
2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles),
sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen prop-
erty), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or
motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contra-
band cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any
act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186
(dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations),
(D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud
in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiv-
ing, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States, or (E)
any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act.
24 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (4) provides: " 'enterprise' includes any individual, partner-
ship, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individ-
uals associated in fact although not a legal entity." For a discussion of the enterprise
element, see Note, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations: Distinguishing the
"Enterprise" Issues, 59 VAsH. U.L.Q. 1343, 1345 (1981). This issue also has been
litigated extensively in the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
580-85 (1981); Bennet v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060-61 (8th Cir. 1982), adopted in
rehearing en banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (1983); United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689
F.2d 1181, 1190-91 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); United States v.
Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 661-65 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982); United
States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 987-90 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183
(1983); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 87-91 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 945 (1983).
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In addition, activities of the enterprise must involve or affect in-
terstate commerce,2 and the plaintiff's business or property must
have suffered an injury resulting from the proscribed behavior.2
6
A pattern of racketeering activity must consist of "at least
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after
[October 15, 1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years
... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activ-
ity. "27 The statute does not, however, attempt to define further
the term pattern.
Because the statute lacks a precise definition of the term pat-
tern, this requirement has been at issue in several RICO cases. 3
This lack of a definition raises three important questions: (1)
whether two predicate acts29 committed within ten years are al-
ways sufficient to form a pattern, (2) whether there must be any
relationship between the two predicate acts, and (3) whether there
is a pattern of activity when the two or more predicate acts are
part of a single criminal episode or transaction.3 0 Examined apart
from any judicial construction, the most information that can be
gleaned from the statutory language is that a pattern involves





RICO was directed expressly toward "the eradication of or-
ganized crime in the United States ' 33 and was drafted broadly to
The requirement that the proscribed activities affect interstate commerce is not
a difficult element to satisfy. See, e.g., Patton, supra note 19, at nn.194-204 and
accompanying text.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), supra note 20. This requirement is commonly called
RICO's civil standing requirement. The Sedima Court addressed the main issues that
civil standing raises. See 105 S. Ct. at 3284-88 (Sedima greatly increased the field of
plaintiffs having standing to bring a civil RICO suit.).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., notes 52-99 infra and accompanying text.
Predicate acts are those activities defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). See note 23
supra.
3 See notes 73-82 infra and accompanying text (discussing the separate criminal
acts requirement in the definition of pattern).
3, See note 22 supra (18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), defining pattern of racketeering activity).
32 For a comprehensive article on the legislative history of RICO, see Blakey, The
RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennet v. Berg, 53 NoTRE DAME
L. REv. 237, 249-80 (1982).
13 See note 3 supra (explaining RICO's legislative intent).
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effect this objective.14 As a result of the statute's expansive word-
ing, courts have rejected the theory that RICO applies only to
defendants who have connections with organized crime a.3  Con-
gress' focus in addressing RICO liability was on the defendant's
conduct rather than on some association with organized crime.1
6
In discussing the RICO statute, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee report 37 indicates that the pattern of racketeering activity
concept is fundamental to the statute's application.38 Although
the Act was intended to be construed liberally, there is evidence
that a wide open construction of the term pattern was not in-
tended. The Senate Judiciary Committee report stated that a pat-
tern is "not defined as two or more acts of racketeering activity,
but requires them." ' 39 Because the legislature chose the word pat-
tern to indicate the required level of racketeering activity, rather
than "event" or "occurrence," RICO impliedly was not intended
to punish isolated activities. The legislative history clearly sup-
ports this interpretation. 4°
-" Congress expressly stated that the provisions of RICO "shall be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes." OCCA § 904(a), at 947.
11 See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984). The Moss court believed that a broad application of
RICO was necessary. "The language of the statute ... does not premise a RICO
violation on proof or allegations of any connection with organized crime." Id. at 21.
See also Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir.) (RICO's application "is not
restricted to organized crime"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983).
11 See McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens
Civil Liberties?, 46 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 55, 142-43 (1970).
17 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
The concept of "pattern" is essential to the operation of the statute.
One isolated "racketeering activity" was thought insufficient to trigger the
remedies provided ... largely because the net would be too large and the
remedies disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. The target of title
IX is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business
normally requires more than one "racketeering activity" and the threat of
continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus
relationship which combines to produce a pattern.
116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (quoting S. RP. No. 617,
at 158).
39 Id.
,o See id. See also Organized Crime Control Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of
the House Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings]. Will R. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, when asked
about incorporating a stricter pattern requirement into the RICO statute, answered:
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Some legislators intended to require a relationship between
the predicate acts themselves. 41 The continuity of the proscribed
action was also a factor that Congress considered.42 The record
establishes, however, that these concepts were either not firmly
fixed in the minds of all legislators or that there may have been
some confusion as to the definition of pattern.
4 3
The legislative history is quite clear that sporadic or isolated
acts were not within RICO's intended scope. 44 While the intention
that there be a relationship between the predicate acts and some
continuity of action is less evident, the record indicates that, at
"we think that those additional requirements would make it [RICO] virtually unenforce-
able. The burden of proof [with respect to the pattern of racketeering activity] will be
difficult at best." Id. at 664. This statement indicates that the pattern requirement was
intended to be construed narrowly. Immediately following Mr. Wilson's remarks, a
question was asked about the absence of a stated requirement of some connection
between racketeering acts. In response, Ronald R. Gainer, Deputy Chief of the Justice
Department's Legislative and Special Projects Section, said: "It [the RICO statute] says
'pattern,' and pattern has to be construed with its normal meaning.... If they are not
related they would not form a pattern." Id. at 665. During these hearings, the Bar
Association of the New York City Committee on Federal Legislation, comparing RICO
to the antitrust statutes, expressed concern that the pattern definition might be too broad
and thus not give effect to congressional intent: "The weakness of the 'pattern of
racketeering activity' definition is to provide that any 2 prohibited acts ... constitute a
pattern. Two antitrust violations ... do not make a hardened antitrust violator, let
alone a pattern of antitrust activity." Id. at 401.
41 Sen. McClellan, a leading proponent of the Act, stated: "The term 'pattern'
itself requires the showing of a relationship.... So, therefore, proof of two acts of
racketeering activity without more, does not establish a pattern ... ." 116 CONG. REc.
18,940 (1970) (quoting S. REP. No. 617).
42 See id. Congress seemed concerned that two acts occurring very close in both
place and time might be construed as a pattern, when in reality the acts were a single
transaction. The continuity element contemplates action occurring over some prolonged
period. See generally notes 73-82 infra and accompanying text (discussing judicial con-
struction of the continuity element).
41 Compare 116 CONG. REc. 35,295 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff: "A 'pattern of
racketeering activity' means simply two or more acts of racketeering activity, one of
which ... must have occurred subsequent to the enactment of the title.") with 116
CONG. REc. 35,193 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff: " '[R]acketeering activity'-at least
two independent offenses forming a pattern of conduct .... ") and House Hearings,
supra note 40, at 665 (expressing concern that the application of the statutory language
might be inconsistent). Senator McClellan, however, clearly contemplated that both a
"relationship" and a "continuity" would be inherent in the pattern requirement. See
also note 38 supra.
" See notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history
of RICO's pattern requirement).
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the very least, some legislators implicitly recognized this require-
ment .
4 1
III. JUrDiCL INTERPRETATION OF THE PATTERN
REQUIREMENT PRIOR TO Sedima
The absence of explicit congressional intent on the face of the
statute has forced courts to attempt to construct a workable def-
inition of the pattern requirement. The judiciary has dealt pri-
marily with two areas of ambiguity: whether the predicate acts
must be related and whether there must be separate criminal ep-
isodes. 46
A. The Relationship Requirement
Courts have disagreed whether a connection between the
predicate racketeering acts is required.47 Furthermore, courts
holding that a relationship must be present have disagreed as to
exactly what kind of relationship is required. 48 Some courts have
held that any relationship between the predicate acts is sufficient
to support a pattern.4 9 Others have required that the predicate
acts be related in the furtherance of a common scheme or ob-
jective.5 0 These issues have been addressed most often in a crim-
inal rather than a civil context .5  In United States v. Stofsky,52
an early criminal RICO action, the Justice Department, in de-
41 See notes 37-43 supra and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of
RICO's pattern requirement and the lack of a consensus as to what the term "pattern"
meant).
"1 See notes 47-103 infra and accompanying text.
4 Compare notes 52-63 infra (cases in which the courts have required some type
of relationship between the predicate acts) with notes 64-69 infra (cases in which no
relationship between the predicate acts was required).
43 See notes 51-63 infra and accompanying text (discussing cases requiring differing
degrees of relationship before a pattern can be found).
,1 See notes 61-62 infra and accompanying text (discussing cases requiring a min-
imal relationship between acts).
:' See notes 51-59 infra and accompanying text.
" Compare notes 52-69 infra (Many criminal cases have dealt with isolated acts
of racketeering, and the lower courts have struggled to discern when these acts form a
pattern.) with notes 86-103 infra (In civil RICO cases, the courts have not been forced
to address instances of isolated racketeering acts and so have assumed generally that a
pattern was present.).
11 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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fending the RICO statute against a void-for-vagueness attack,
suggested that there is a "relationship" requirement implicit in
the term pattern. 3 The Justice Department urged that the pro-
scribed acts must be part of a common sceme.M The Stofsky
court held that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague and
that pattern means "more than accidental or unrelated instances
of proscribed behavior, ' 5  thereby adopting the Justice Depart-
ment's construction of the term. 6
Several courts followed Stofsky's lead and required that the
activities be related through a common scheme or plan.57 Some
functional standards for the application of a common scheme
requirement were set out in United States v. Dean.13 The Dean
court strived to discern situations in which more than one distinct
pattern, and thus more than one RICO offense, arise from nu-
merous, varied racketeering acts. To aid in this determination,
the Dean court listed five factors to be considered in determining
a pattern: (1) the time the various activities took place, (2) the
persons involved, (3) the statutory offenses, (4) the nature and
scope of the activities, and (5) the places where the activities oc-
curred.59 Although decided prior to Dean,60 Stofsky relied on some
of these factors in determining the requisite common sceme de-
53 The Justice Department stated that this relationship was "best characterized as
requiring: that those offenses were connected with each other by some common scheme,
plan or motive so as to constitute a pattern and not simply a series of disconnected
acts." Id. at 613.
See id.
5S Id.
See id. at 614. See also note 53 supra.
57 See, e.g., United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1362 (The court approved
jury instruction was: "that the offenses were connected with each other by some common
scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a pattern, and not merely a series of
disconnected acts.") (emphasis added in opinion), reh'g denied, 749 F.2d 733 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3476 (1985); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1203,
1222 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The pattern may be established by showing two or more acts
that constitute offenses, conspiracies or attempts of the requisite type, as long as the
defendant committed two of the acts and both of them were connected by a common
scheme, plan or motive."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); United States v. Starnes,
644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir.) ("When two or more of those acts are connected to each
other in some logical manner so as to effect an unlawful end, a pattern of racketeering
exists".), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981).
" 647 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982).
19 Id. at 788.
60 Stofsky was decided in 1973, eight years prior to Dean.
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lationship. 61 While not explicity requiring a common objective,
other courts have required a relationship between the racketeering
activities before finding a pattern. 62 Presumably, courts that re-
quire some relationship between the predicate RICO offenses
would dismiss a claim based on activities far removed in both
substance and time.
63
Many courts, however, have rejected the predicate acts re-
lationship concept and have adopted a lower standard. 4 In United
States v. Elliott,65 the Fifth Circuit held that a criminal RICO
action does not require any relationship between the predicate
racketeering acts other than their relationship to the enterprise's
affairs.66 In United States v. Weisman,67 the court again rejected
the Stofsky requirement and refused to expand judicially the sta-
tutory language to require any specific relationship between the
61 See 409 F. Supp. at 612-14. In determining what acts indicated a pattern, the
Stofsky court looked at the statutory offenses, the time frame in which the offenses
occurred, and the nature and scope of the activities.
6 See, e.g., 644 F.2d at 678; United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.) (citing
United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Wis. 1974)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921
(1977). The Kaye court stated:
In my judgment, there is implicit in the statutory definition of "pattern of
racketeering activity" a requirement that the government must prove such
an interrelatedness .... Absent a showing of a "pattern" or interrelated-
ness of such activity, § 1962(c) could be used against the isolated acts of
an independent criminal; such was not the intended target of the challenged
statute.
Id. at 860-61. The White court had said: "Use of the term 'pattern' in connection with
two racketeering acts committed by the same person suggests that the two must have a
greater interrelationship than simply commission by a common perpetrator." 386 F.
Supp. at 883.
1' Under this interpretation, for example, presumably a RICO claim could not be
founded on one act of car theft and a later unrelated act of arson. See, e.g., note 65
infra.
., See notes 65-69 infra and accompanying text.
"' 571 F.2d 880, reh'g denied, 575 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978). Elliott involved the prosecution of six defendants charged with committing at
least twenty different but marginally related criminal acts. The activities ranged from
burning an unoccupied nursing home to car theft to intimidating a witness. The six
defendants did not act in concert with respect to any of the crimes charged. The Fifth
Circuit found the relationship of the activities to the enterprise sufficient to support the
RICO claim. See id.
6 See id. at 899 n.23 (The court refused to read into the statute a relationship
requirement that was not evident on the statute's face.).
1, 624 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
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predicate acts.68 Many other courts have agreed with Elliott and
Weisman, holding that the only nexus required is between the
predicate acts and the enterprise.
69
The majority of the federal circuit courts have required some
sort of relationship between the predicate acts before finding a
pattern of racketeering activity. 70 In light of both the common
meaning attributed to the term pattern7' and the evidence of
congressional intent,72 there should be, at a minimum, some re-
6 See id. The Weisman court stated:
[T]he statutory language does not expressly require that the predicate acts
of racketeering be specifically "related" to each other and we find no
affirmative evidence in the legislative history from which we should infer
such a requirement .... [T]he enterprise itself supplies a significant unify-
ing link between the various predicate acts specified in § 1961(1) that may
constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity."
Id. at 1122.
69 See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1052, reh'g denied, 663 F.2d
101 (5th Cir. 1981) (agreeing with the Elliott court: "the enterprise supplies a unifying
link between all the predicate acts charged, since all the predicate acts must be committed
in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1932);
United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("It was this ten year
limitation that provided any requirement of nexus between the two predicate acts....
[Hiad it [Congress] wanted to provide for any 'relatedness' it had ample opportunity to
do so.").
70 See notes 52-63 supra and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit required that
the predicate acts be related to each other in some logical manner. See United States v.
Starnes, 644 F.2d at 678 (defendants were convicted of violating RICO through acts of
arson to defraud an insurer); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d at 860 (defendant was
convicted of violating RICO through acts that violated the Labor Management Relations
Act). The Eighth Circuit required that the acts constitute a common scheme or objective.
See United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d at 788 (district court's finding that a conviction
under both RICO and the Travel Act amounted to double jeopardy was reversed and
remanded). The Ninth Circuit also required that the acts constitute a common scheme
or plan. See United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d at 1222 (defendants' motion to dismiss
under the double jeopardy clause was dismissed because the defendants were convicted
of both substantive RICO violations and conspiracy under RICO). The
Eleventh Circuit likewise required a relationship between the acts that amounted to a
common scheme or motive. See United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d at 1362 (defendants
were convicted of RICO violations for conspiracy to import and distribute drugs). The
Fifth Circuit, however, required no relationship between the predicate acts themselves.
See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 899 (defendants were convicted of RICO
violations even though the predicate acts were not related to each other). The Second
Circuit also refused to require any relationship between the acts. See United States v.
Weisman, 624 F.2d at 1122, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
71 See note 163 infra (dictionary definition of pattern).
7 See notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of
RICO's pattern requirement).
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lationship before a pattern exists. Logically, it seems that such a
pattern could be demonstrated either by a relationship between
the predicate acts themselves or by the fact that all of the acts
were intended to accomplish a common objective.
B. The Separate Criminal Episodes Requirement
A second issue that arises from the absence of a statutory
definition of pattern is whether separate criminal acts in a single
scheme or plan constitute single or multiple racketeering acts.
Because of this uncertainty, a pattern can be constructed from
acts that are so closely related in time and place that they are
really a part of the same transaction. 73 This issue arises most often
when the proscribed activities involve two or more violations of
the mall fraud74 or wire fraud 75 statutes in furtherance of a single
scheme or plan.76 In general, courts deciding criminal RICO cases
" See notes 79-82 infra and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Moeller,
which involved two charged offenses arising out of the same arson attempt).
', 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) provides:
Whoever, having devised or intended to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of,
loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure
for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or
other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be
such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any
such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according
to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be
delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing,
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
S18 U.S.C. § 1343 provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to
be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in
interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
16 See, e.g, United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, 412 (6th Cir.) (One telephone
call and one act of wiring money as a part of an ongoing scheme to defraud were two
separate activities that formed a pattern.), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); United
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have found that the acts, regardless of their substance, need not
be completely independent to make up the requisite pattern.7 At
least one court, however, has required that a threat of continuing
activity be demonstrated before finding a pattern.7
In United States v. Moeller,79 the court extensively con-
sidered the separate criminal episodes issue. The Moeller
defendants were charged with two offenses arising during an
arson attempt: arson of a business and kidnapping of three
of the employees of the business.80 The acts occurred at the
same time, in the same place, and in furtherance of a single
criminal episode. The court interpreted "pattern" to imply
"acts occurring in different criminal episodes,"' 1  but was
States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978) (Five mailings in the
course of a single fraudulent scheme constituted a pattern for RICO purposes.); United
States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Six acts of wire fraud in one
scheme satisfied RICO's pattern requirement because a single victim served as the
connecting link.); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp. 195, 200 (E.D. Pa.) aff'd, 588
F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1978) (A single, ongoing scheme to defraud through a series of acts
of bribery can establish a pattern for RICO purposes.).
7 Acts arising out of a single criminal episode have been found sufficient to
support a RICO violation. See, e.g., United States v. Vatchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1475,
(11th Cir.) reh'g denied, 766 F.2d 1493 (1985), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 879 (19*06) (When
the defendant shot three separate officers in one incident, the court held that these were
three separate violations of the attempted murder statute and were sufficient to constitute
a violation of RICO.); United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 678 (7th Cir.) (Several
acts were committed as a part of a single criminal scheme or conspiracy to effect arson
and each act was held to be a separate act constituting a pattern under RICO.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 826 (1981); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 438 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). (Two acts of interstate transportation of stolen checks
in furtherance of a single scheme were held to create a pattern.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
820 (1976). But see, e.g., United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 639 F.2d 1181,
1189 (4th Cir. 1982) (The court expressed "doubt that Congress ever contemplated the
extension of the RICO statute to include a situation where one of the predicate offenses,
separated in character and by a long time period, could combine with a set of closely
related wire fraud and mail fraud claims ... to meet the predicate requirements of so
serious a statute."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
79 See United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff d, 578
F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 139 U.S. 801 (1978). (The court, quoting from
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970), stated: "The language of the Act, which
makes a pattern of conduct the essence of the crime, 'clearly contemplates a prolonged
course of conduct.' "), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1979).
402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
See id. at 57.
Judge Newman stated:
Were the question open, I would have seriously doubted whether the
word 'pattern' as used in § 1962(c) should be construed to mean two acts
occurring at the same place on the same day in the course of the same
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compelled to follow the Second Circuit's decision that held to
the contrary. 2
To be consistent with both the common usage of the term
pattern"3 and the congressional intent in adopting RICO, 84 the
courts should require some level of continuity before finding a
pattern of racketeering activity. Surely Congress did not antic-
ipate that two telephone calls made to the same person within
five minutes reasonably could be construed to show such a
pattern. By requiring either continuity of activity or multiple
episodes of activity, the courts could ensure that only those
really engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity would fall
under RICO.
C. Civil RICO Actions
As the two previous sections indicate, the pattern require-
ment has been addressed most often in criminal RICO prose-
cutions.8 5 In civil RICO cases, courts generally have assumed
that the commission of any two predicate acts represents a
pattern of racketeering activity and have not considered this
requirement a major issue." In Hulse v. Hale Farms Develop-
criminal episode. While the statutory definition makes clear that a pattern
can consist of only two acts, I would have thought the common sense
interpretation of the word "pattern" implies acts occurring in different
criminal episodes, episodes that are at least somewhat separated in time
and place yet still sufficiently related by purpose to demonstrate a conti-
nuity of activity. I would further have thought that the normal canon of
narrowly construing penal statutes points toward such a interpretation.
Finally, I would have thought the legislative history made such an inter-
pretation clear.
Id. at 57-58 (emphasis in original). See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
- See 402 F. Supp. at 58. But See United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d at 438
(holding two acts within a single scheme sufficient to constitute a pattern).
" See note 163 infra (dictionary definition of pattern).
See notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of
RICO's pattern requirement).
11 See notes 52-82 supra and accompanying text (discussing cases interpreting
criminal RICO's pattern requirement).
See Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th
Cir. 1984). Alcorn arose from illegal purchases by a county employee. On several
occasions, the defendant sold office supplies at inflated prices to a county employee,
violating Mississippi law. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the
plaintiffs had failed to allege that the defendants were connected with organized crime
and therefore ineligible for civil RICO remedies. In analyzing the required RICO ele-
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ment Corp. ,7 the court recognized explicitly that the plaintiff
had the burden of alleging and proving a pattern. s5 The court,
however, required only "two or more mailings incident to an
essential element of a scheme to defraud .. . ," without analyz-
ing further the pattern involved.8 9
Civil cases that have addressed expressly the substance rather
than form of the pattern issue are infrequent. In Beth Israel Med-
ical Center v. Smith,90 separate acts of mail and wire fraud were
committed over an eighteen month period in connection with a
single criminal scheme. 9' The court, apparently rejecting a mul-
tiple episode requirement, found no merit in the defendants' as-
sertion that "separate acts of mail and wire fraud arising out of
a common nucleus of facts" were not separate RICO offenses.92
Nevertheless, the court implicitly endorsed a requirement of re-
lationship between the predicate acts, which the court found to
be consistent with its acceptance of a single episode as a pattern. 93
One of the few cases in which a court has dismissed a civil
RICO claim for failure to show a requisite pattern occurred in
Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie.94 Teleprompter in-
volved several bribes that a city councilman received at a fund-
raiser. 95 The court held that these acts were not "a series of
incidents and schemes which are ongoing' 96 and were not, there-
fore, a pattern within RICO's reach. 97 In dictum, the court in-
dicated that even an extensive number of such violations occurring
ments, the court merely assumed that the pattern of racketeering activity requirement
had been met because two predicate acts had occurred. See Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan,
727 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1984). The defendants in Sutliff depleted a small oil
company's cash and assets by taking advantage of its owner. This left the company
without resources to pay its creditors. The defendants' use of the mails and telephone
constituted the predicate acts upon which the RICO claim was based. The court did not
even address the pattern issue, stating simply that "we believe the complaint adequately
alleges a 'pattern of racketeering activity'. ... " Id. at 653.
586 F. Supp. 120 (D. Conn. 1984).
See id. at 121.
" Id. at 122.
576 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
9, See id. at 1063-64.
91 See id. at 1066.
93 See id.
537 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
1 See id. at 8-9.
Id. at 12-13 (emphasis in original).
97 See id. at 13.
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at a single event still would not constitute a pattern. Teleprompt-
er was a significant departure from other civil RICO actions that
only cursorily addressed the pattern requirement. 99
When left to their own interpretations, courts have construed
the term pattern to encompass diverse and varied elements'. Some
courts have examined the actual predicate acts for some common
scheme or purpose; 1'0 some have required no relationship at all
between the acts themselves, requiring only that the acts be re-
lated to the enterprise; 10' and still others have focused on the
predicate acts underlying a single "episode."' 02 The United States
Supreme Court addressed these conflicting opinions in a back-
handed way in its Sedima decision. 03
IV. Sedima1 4
As previously noted, the Sedima decision'015 was instrumental
in removing several judicially imposed restrictions on private RICO
claimants.' 6 The Court declined to address directly the pattern
of racketeering activity requirement, stating that the requirement
was not in issue.'0 7 The majority, however, stated in dictum that
.1 The court stated: "Even if plaintiff could prove that each and every employee
or associate ... bribed Meredith at the fundraiser, it would only constitute one single
act of unlawful activity." Id.
' See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text (discussing Hulse v. Hale Farms
Development Corp., indicating the ease with which civil RICO's pattern requirement
can be satisfied).
'o See notes 47-63 supra and accompanying text.
'o, See notes 64-69 supra and accompanying text.
, 2 See notes 73-82 supra and accompanying text.
lul See notes 104-124 infra and accompanying text (discussing both majority and
dissenting opinions in the Sedima decision).
Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
' Sedima dealt with a corporation that had entered into a joint business venture
with an exporter. The corporation alleged that it had been overbilled and cheated by
the exporter. The corporation sued the exporter, alleging a RICO violation based upon
the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. The trial court dismissed the RICO counts
for failure to state a claim, and the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, stating: "The complaint is not deficient for failure to
allege either an injury separate from the financial loss stemming from the alleged acts
of mail and wire fraud, or prior convictions of the defendants." Id. at 3287.
' See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text (discussing the removal of both a
previous conviction of predicate criminal violations and an allegation of specific RICO-
type injury as bars to a civil RICO action).
10, 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
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one of the major factors contributing to the possibly overbroad
application of RICO's civil provisions is "the failure of Congress
to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern.' "103 The Court also
supplied a footnote that sheds some light on the proper inter-
pretation of the term pattern.10 9 The majority stated:
[T]he definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity" dif-
fers from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it states that a
pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," §
1961(5), not that it "means" two such acts. The implication is
that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient.
Indeed, in common parlance two of anything do not generally
form a "pattern." "o
The Court cited RICO's legislative history,' which it said "sup-
ports the view that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do
not constitute a pattern. ' " 2 Furthermore, the Court looked to
the language of another provision of the same statute, 18 U.S.C.
section 3575(e)," 3 saying that it is "more enlightening" and might
"be useful in interpreting" RICO's pattern requirement." 4 Sec-
tion 3575(e) uses more specific language in its definition of pat-
tern: "[Criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal
acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated
by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.""15
The patterns that section 3575(e) addresses are similar to those
,01 Id. The other major factor the Court pointed to as responsible for the "extraor-
dinary uses to which civil Rico has been put" is the broad range of predicate offenses,
which include wire, mail, and securities fraud. See id.
,09 See id. at 3285 n.14.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. See also notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text (legislative history
shows some contemplation of "relatedness" and "continuity" requirements).
105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14.
18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982).
"" 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14.
"5 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e). The section provides for the sentencing of special offenders.
The sentences of three specific types of criminals were increased substantially: (1)
"habitual" criminals, those with at least two earlier felony convictions; (2) "profes-
sional" criminals, those for whom the crime was a part of a pattern of'criminal activity
designed to furnish a source of income and in which the "professional" possessed a
skill; and (3) "organized" criminals, those whose criminal activity was in furtherance of
a conspiracy involving a pattern of criminal conduct.
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that RICO addresses-persons engaging in a continuing practice
of proscribed criminal acts."
6
Justice Powell, dissenting from Sedima's majority opinion,
expounded at length on the need for a specific judicial construc-
tion of the pattern requirement." 7 Citing both the legislative
history"8 and the American Bar Association (ABA) Task Force
Report on Civil RICO, " 9 Justice Powell conceded that the statute
might be read as broadly as the majority had endorsed, but stated
that he did not "believe that it must be so read."' 20 To effect a
116 See id. See also note 15 supra (criminals addressed by § 3575(e) are all charac-
terized by the continuous nature of their actions).
"1 105 S. Ct. at 3290 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell noted that the majority
had conceded that the " 'pattern' requirement could be narrowly construed" and that
this element was not at issue in the instant case. Id.
"8 Justice Powell stated:
The legislative history reveals that Congress did not state explicitly that the
statute would reach only members of the Mafia because it believed there
were constitutional problems with establishing such a specific status of-
fense. (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the legislative history makes clear
that the statute was intended to be applied to organized crime, and an
influential sponsor of the bill emphasized that any effect it had beyond
such crime was meant to be only incidental. (citation omitted).
Id. at 3289.
-' Justice Powell, quoting from the ABA Task Force Report on Civil RICO
[hereinafter cited as "ABA Report"], stated that the ABA Report concurred with and
supported the legislative intent:
In an attempt to ensure the constitutionality of the statute, Congress
made the central proscription of the statute the use of a 'pattern of
racketeering activities' in connection with an 'enterprise,' rather than merely
outlawing membership in the Mafia, La Cosa Nostra, or other organized
criminal syndicates. 'Racketeering' was defined to embrace a potpourri of
federal and state criminal offenses deemed to be the type of criminal
activities frequently engaged in by mobsters, racketeers and other tradi-
tional members of 'organized crime.' The 'pattern' element of the statute
was designed to limit its application to planned, ongoing, continuing crime
as opposed to sporadic, unrelated, isolated criminal episodes. The 'enter-
prise' element, when coupled with the 'pattern' requirement, was intended
by the Congress to keep the reach of RICO focused directly on traditional
organized crime and comparable ongoing criminal activities carried out in
a structured, organized environment. The reach of the statute beyond
traditional mobster and racketeer activity and comparable ongoing struc-
tured criminal enterprises, was intended to be incidental, and only to the
extent necessary to maintain the constitutionality of a statute aimed pri-
marily at organized crime. ABA Report at 71-72.
12 Id.
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statutory construction consistent with both a narrower scope of
application and the legislative intent, Justice Powell would re-
quire a stricter pattern requirement.1
2'
Agreeing with the ABA Task Force Report on Civil RICO,1' "
Justice Powell interpreted the term pattern to require "that (i)
the racketeering acts be related to each other, (ii) they be part of
some common scheme, and (iii) some sort of continuity between
the acts or a threat of continuing criminal activity must be
shown. 123 According to Powell's analysis, the result of such a
construction would further the legislative intent: "By construing
'pattern' to focus on the manner in which the crime was per-
petrated, courts could go a long way toward limiting the reach
of the statute to its intended target-organized crime."12 4
Considering the majority's footnoted explanation of the term
pattern in conjunction with Justice Powell's dissent supplies the
most information to date about the ultimate judicial interpreta-
tion of the pattern requirement. The Court probably will require
at least some nexus between the predicate acts of racketeering
activity and possibly some continuity of criminal action before
finding a pattern in the underlying predicate acts.125
V. BEYOND Sedima
A continuity of action requirement could be the element that
courts focus on in limiting future civil RICO actions. The De-
partment of Justice has already taken this approach in its criminal
121 See id.
"1 See note 119 supra.
'1 See 105 S. Ct. at 3290 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing the ABA Report at 193-
208).
' Id.
I' Both the Sedima majority and Justice Powell's dissent mentioned a continuity
of action inherent in a pattern. Justice White, quoting from the legislative history,
stated: "The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than one 'rack-
eteering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of
continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern." Id. at 3285 n.14
(emphasis in original). Justice Powell, citing the ABA Report, suggested that one
requirement in finding a pattern should be "some sort of continuity between the acts or
a threat of continuing criminal activity." Id. at 3290 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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RICO prosecutions. 26 In civil RICO actions, however, multiple
criminal acts commonly occur during a single criminal episode. 127
Some courts, therefore, find a pattern without requiring any real
continuity of action. 128
If courts construe the pattern element to require racketeering
activity in more than one criminal episode, a number of civil
RICO actions would fail to meet this criterion, 129 and courts
could focus on the types of actions Congress intended civil RICO
to address. 30 Considering all of the facts and circumstances
attendant to each case, courts could determine whether there
was a continuity and interrelationship of action sufficient to
form a pattern of racketeering activity. 131
A proposed amendment to the RICO statute addresses the
elements of relationship and continuity. 3 2  House Bill
11 The Department of Justice RICO guidelines state: "No indictment shall be
brought [under RICO] based upon a pattern of racketeering activity growing out of a
single criminal episode or transaction." United States Attorney's Manual, Criminal
Division, Guideline 9-110.340 (1983).
117 See notes 73-82 supra and accompanying text (cases discussing the separate
criminal episode requirement).
"I See, e.g., notes 73-77, 71-73 supra and accompanying text (discussing situation
in which pattern is found in what is essentially one transaction).
'" See Blakey, supra note 11, at 36-37. Blakey's article cited the ABA Report,
stating: "37% of civil RICO cases involve securities in a commercial or business setting.
A review of most of these cases indicates that they usually involve an alleged single
scheme entailing multiple mailings and telephone calls." Id. at 38 n.42.
'I See id. at 37. Blakey postulated: "The pattern determination, or at least one
half of it, may rest upon the affirmative answer to the question, 'does the conduct
alleged to constitute the pattern of racketeering activity span more than one episode?'
If so, it is sufficiently continuous to constitute a pattern-assuming that the acts are
related to one another." Id.
I" See id. Blakey asserts that the determination of a pattern should be independent
of the quantitative element and that the requisite is fact specific:
This determination cannot universally rest on any one factor, such as
duration, number of victims, number of acts or nature of acts. One cannot
make hard and fast rules, such as one scheme can never be a pattern, or
a pattern must involve more than one victim. Any one factor can be
isolated, made constant and included in hypothetical situations from which
a trier of fact may-and may not-infer a "pattern" in the broad sense
of the word.
The courts may examine the totality of the circumstances and decide
whether there is sufficient demonstration of continuity to warrant labeling
the conduct a "pattern"-independent of the number of acts of racketeer-
ing activity involved.
Id.
132 H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985). This proposed bill provides in part:
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251711 proposes changes in the portion of the statute defining a
"pattern of criminal activity."' 3 4 In those violations common to
civil RICO actions,'35 principally mail' 36 and wire fraud, 37 the
new pattern definition would require both an interrelationship
between the predicate acts' and separate episodes of activity.
This amendment would also make the definition of pattern
consistent with definitional language elsewhere in the statute by
using the wording "pattern ... means" instead of "pattern...
requires."1 39 An amendment like this, using more precise defi-
nitions, would alleviate most of the confusion over the two
crucial elements necessary to constitute a pattern of racketeering
activity. 140
In the first civil RICO case decided since Sedima, Northern
Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc.,"4 the court addressed
the pattern issue even though neither party briefed the issue.
42
The court stated that the complaint's failure to allege a proper
"(5) 'pattern of criminal activity' means two or more acts of predicate
criminal activity, separate in time and place-
"(A) each of which occurred not more than five years before the
indictment is found, or information is instituted, that names such acts
as predicate criminal activity;
"(B) all of which are not violations of the same provision of law, if
that provision of law is-
"(i) the second undesignated paragraph of section 2314 (relating
to the transportation of stolen goods, securities, moneys, fraudulent
State tax stamps, or articles used in counterfeiting) of this title;
"(ii) section 1341 (relating to mail fraud) of this title; or
"(iii) section 1342 (relating to wire fraud) of this title; and
"(C) that are interrelated by a common scheme, plan, or motive, and




131 See note 132 supra (H.R. 2517 § 5(B)).
"1 See note 74 supra (18 U.S.C. § 1341, covering mail fraud).
117 See note 75 supra (18 U.S.C. § 1342, covering wire fraud).
' See note 132 supra (H.R. 2517 § 5(C)),
9 Compare note 22 supra (pattern of racketeering activity "requires" ... ) with
note 23 supra (pattern of racketeering activity "means" . ..
-4 See notes 46-103 supra and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretation
of the pattern requirement prior to Sedima).
14, 615 F, Supp, 828 (N.D. Il. 1985).
41 See id. Inryco involved an alleged attempt to defraud. One of the defendant's
(Inryco) employees was accused of receiving illegal kickbacks from a subcontractor and
the subcontractor was accused of failing to satisfactorily perform its work. See id. at
829-30.
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pattern of racketeering activity was "dispositive of Inryco's mo-
tion [to dismiss] and mandate[d] Inryco's dismissal from the
Complaint."' 43 The court then discussed at length the Sedima pat-
tern requirement. 44
The Inryco court rejected completely the contention of prior
courts that a pattern could be formed simply from multiple acts. 4
The dismissed complaint alleged that two mailings were made in
connection with a subcontract and kickbacks.46 The court found
that these mailings, though each was allegedly a separate act of
mail fraud, 47 were insufficient to form a pattern.'" While the
mailings satisfied the relationship requirement, the mailings failed
to establish the required continuity element. 149 Interpretating the
,41 See id. at 830.
144 The Inryco court stated:
To be sure, Sedima ... also spoke in dictum. But its message was
both plain and deliberate: Lower courts concerned about RICO's expansive
potential would be best advised to focus on the hitherto largely ignored
"pattern" concept.
Sedima thus clearly creates a whole new ballgame. With such an unmis-
takeable signal from the Supreme Court, the Court is no longer obligated
to follow contrary Court of Appeals opinions.
Id. at 832-33.
"' The Inryco court, in analyzing the Seventh Circuit's opinion in United States v.
Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978), agreed with requiring a relationship between
the predicate acts or some common scheme, but said that the Weatherspoon court:
[fJ]umped the tracks when it eluded the separate statutory requirement of
a "pattern" by simply equating multiple acts with that requirement.
That non sequitur will no longer wash, in light of Sedima's proper
emphasis on "pattern" as an independent component of a RICO claim
under the plain language of the statute.
615 F. Supp. at 833. See also note 76 supra.
141 The first violation occurred when the defendant mailed the subcontract to the
subcontractor and the second occurred when the subcontractor mailed a kickback check
to the defendant's employee. See 615 F. Supp. at 833.
" See note 74 supra (18 U.S.C. § 1341, covering mail fraud).
"4' See 615 F. Supp. at 833.
"'4 The court stated:
True enough, "pattern" connotes similarity, hence the cases' proper
emphasis on relatedness of the constituent acts. But "pattern" also con-
notes a multiplicity of events: Surely the continuity inherent in the term
presumes repeated criminal activity, not merely repeated acts to carry out
the same criminal activity. It places a real strain on the language to speak
of a single fraudulent effort, implemented by several fraudulent acts, as a
"pattern of racketeering activity."
Id. at 831 (emphasis in original).
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pattern requirement in light of Sedima, the court, even without
the aid of a more precisely defined statute, narrowed civil RICO's
application.
Several civil RICO cases have been decided since Inryco. While
those decisions generally heed the Sedima warning to pay more
attention to the pattern requirement, 50 the standard for deter-
mining whether a pattern is present remains unresolved'5' and
widely varied. One court found that the pattern requirement was
not at issue because three predicate acts were alleged instead of
two.' 52 Another court interpreted Sedima as demanding very little
beyond the requirement of two predicate acts and some relation-
ship between them. 53 Other courts have gone further by requiring
continuity of action.-
4
In addition to the requirements that Sedima's dicta suggested,
two courts have addressed the holding and dicta of Inryco.'5 One
district court agreed with Inryco's interpretation, requiring that
the predicate acts be related and that continuity of action in the
form of more than one criminal episode be present.Y6 In different
, See notes 104-125 supra and accompanying text.
"' See notes 152-160 infra and accompanying text.
52 See Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States v. Alexander Grant
and Co., No. 85 Civ. 3595 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1985). But see Modern Settings, Inc. v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., No. 83 Civ. 6291 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1986).
"I See R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985) (Two acts
of mail fraud were sufficient to form a pattern because the acts were related.).
04 See Illinois Dept. of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985). The
Seventh Circuit stated that the "defendant's mailing of nine fraudulent tax returns...
over a nine month period constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity as defined by the
statute." Id. at 313. See also Alexander Grant and Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 770 F.2d 717
(8th Cir. 1985) 106 S. Ct. 799 (1986). The Eighth Circuit held that "[t]he number and
nature of acts, together with allegations demonstrating their similar purposes, results,
participants, victims, and methods of commission, bespeak a sufficient 'continuity plus
relationship' to satisfy the Supreme Court's concerns in Sedirna that RICO not be
extended to reach sporadic activity." Id. at 718 n.l. See also No. 83 Civ. 6291 (two
acts of securities fraud in separate transactions held to constitute a pattern, but multiple
sales, each of which possibly violated the securities law, was insufficient because each
was a part of the same transaction); Papagiannis v. Pontikis, 108 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (holding that fraudulent acts committed on multiple victims constituted a pattern).
The Pontikis court criticized the Fifth Circuit's decision in R.A.G.S. Couture saying,
"the opinion wholly ignores the concept of 'continuity' of criminal activity emphasized
by Congress and the Supreme Court." 108 F.R.D. at 179 n.3.
113 See notes 141-162 supra and accompanying text.
116 Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F. Supp. 474, 477-78 (C.D. Cal. 1985). The Allington
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opinions, the Illinois district court both agreed and disagreed with
its own holding in Inryco.- 7 One decision agreed with Sedima's
continuity requirement as discussed in the Inryco holding. 158 A
second decision considered both Sedima and Inryco and found
"that it takes at least two fraudulent schemes or episodes, related
by common purposes, methods or results, to make up a 'pattern
of racketeering activity.' "19 Several other decisions, however,
have disagreed with a pattern interpretation that requires multiple
schemes. 6I As one opinion stated, "[t]he criminal acts must dem-
onstrate both a continuity and a relationship. However, this court
does not agree with the suggestion that a 'pattern of racketeering
activity' cannot be established with respect to a single fraudulent
scheme."' 6 1 Further confusion was added by a subsequent crim-
court found that, in light of Sedima, the RICO complaint failed to allege wire fraud
acts that would satisfy the pattern requirement. The court stated:
IT]he alleged predicate acts must show both "continuity" and "related-
ness" to constitute a pattern .... The relatedness of the predicate acts is
established through proof of common perpetrators, common methods of
commission or common victims.
To show continuity of racketeering activity, on the other hand, the
predicate acts must have occurred in different criminal episodes. Such a
requirement is consistent with the connotation of multiple events implicit
in the term "pattern."
Consistent with this intent to exclude single criminal events, a "pat-
tern" of racketeering activity must include racketeering acts sufficiently
unconnected in time or substance to warrant consideration as separate
criminal episodes.
Id. at 477-78.
'" Judge Shadur wrote the opinion in Inryco. See 615 F. Supp. 828.
See 108 F.R.D. 177.
' ' See Evanston Bank v. Conticommodity Serv's, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1014, 1025
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (The court found that a pattern existed in acts of securities, wire and
mail fraud.).
"I Compare notes 158-159 supra and accompanying text with notes 161-62 infra
and accompanying text.
- Trak Microcumputer Corp. v. Wearne Bros., No. 84 C. 7970 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
25, 1985). This Illinois court agreed with Judge Shadur's Inryco comment that "more
than a mere counting of 'racketeering activity' is necessary to determine whether a
'pattern of racketeering activity' has been stated." Id. The court disagreed that there
must be more than one scheme involved. The court stated that "[n]othing in the language
of Sedima suggests that in order to find a 'pattern of racketeering activity' a pattern of
fraudulent schemes must be pled. Rather, Sedima only requires that the racketeering
activity be continuous and related." Id. Other decisions in the same district followed
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inal RICO opinion in which the court found that ten bribery pay-
ments to a single person to fix ten separate lawsuits was
distinguishable from Inryco and constituted a pattern. 62 This dis-
agreement among the courts is clear evidence that Sedima has not
laid the pattern controversy to rest.
CONCLUSION
When providing for a civil cause of action and treble damage
remedy under RICO, surely Congress could not have intended
an essential element of the statute's application to be open to so
many inconsistent judicial interpretations. The very fact that RICO
was enacted as a part of the Organized Crime Control Act in-
dicates that Congress had a particular type of offender in mind.
It is also plausible that Congress intended, by its use of the term
pattern, to incorporate the commonly understood definition 63 of
that word into the statutory requirement. Assuming that this was
Congress' intent, RICO should apply only to criminals with a
propensity to engage in the statute's proscribed activity.
If this construction of congressional intent is adopted, the
concepts of relationship between the predicate acts and continuity
of the criminal conduct become crucial elements of the pattern
requirement. The presence of these elements would help to ensure
that RICO was reaching those offenders at which it was originally
aimed. By judicially imposing these requisites, the courts can, in
effect, plug the "hole" in the statute that threatens to grow larger
and larger.
Certainly, Congress ultimately will address this confused area
and clarify congressional intent through a statutory amendment.
the holding in Trak Microcomputer, rather than Inryco. See also Corcoran Partners,
Ltd. v. Dresser Indus., No. 84 C. 4506 (N.D. IU. Dec. 18, 1985) ("This court finds
nothing in the language of the RICO statute which requires a plaintiff to allege a pattern
of fraudulent schemes. .. "); Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222, 225 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (Continuous activity "requires more than a single transaction but not necessarily
more than a single scheme.").
- United States v. Yonan, 623 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. I1. 1985) (Judge Shadur wrote
the opinions in both Inryca and Yonan.).
16, The ordinary meaning of "pattern" is "[a]n established mode of behavior or
cluster of mental attitudes, beliefs and values held in common by members of a group,"
or "[a] reliable sample of traits, acts or other observable features characterizing an
individual." WEBs ER 's Tmlur NEw INTERNATioNAL DICTnONARY (P.B. Gove ed. 1970).
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In fact, the Sedima Court has stated that it is Congress' respon-
sibility, rather than the judiciary's, to narrow the statute's ap-
plication.' 64 Until a case in which the pattern requirement is at
issue is presented to the United States Supreme Court, the lower
courts will continue to interpret the requirement inconsistently.
The guidance of Sedima's dictum, however, could effect a con-
struction that would act as a "finger in the dike," thereby holding
back a flood of unintended litigation while the courts wait
patiently for a legislative rescue.
Jamie Middleton Clark
'll Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). The Supreme Court
stated that any defect inherent in the statute must be corrected by Congress: "It is not
for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has provided
it simply because plaintiffs are not taking advantage of it in its more difficult applica-
tions." Id. at 3287.
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